Parsifal D’Sola, Founder and Executive Director of the Andres Bello Foundation, explains how the Chinese government’s promotion of itself as a great power makes it hard for some Latin American leaders to see Beijing as an authoritarian power.
Parsifal D’Sola is the Founder and Executive Director of the Andres Bello Foundation, which focuses on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. D’Sola, who holds graduate degrees from Columbia University and London University, spent eight years living in Beijing, where he worked for the China Files news agency. A non-resident Fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, he specializes in Sino-Latin American relations, particularly with Venezuela.
D’Sola spoke about the PRC government’s engagement in Latin America with Jessica Ludwig, Director of Freedom and Democracy at the Bush Institute, and William McKenzie, Senior Editorial Advisor at the Bush Institute. As he notes, the specifics of China’s engagement depends upon the country and their economic and political systems. However it does engage, Beijing’s goal is to portray China as a friendly partner and to contrast itself with the United States and the West. Promoting itself across Latin America as a great power, D’Sola explains, makes it hard for some Latin American politicians to see the government in Beijing for what it is: an authoritarian power.
How would you describe the nature of China’s engagement in Latin America?
The first point is that Latin America is not a unified region. There are different sides to the region in terms of economics, political systems, and strengths. There are countries as large as Brazil and Mexico. There are small islands in the Caribbean. And there is very little cooperation or coordination in terms of foreign policy. This is very important to take into account when we are talking about China and Latin America relations.
The same goes with the way China engages with the region. China’s engagement varies depending upon the country. Venezuela’s relationship with China or Cuba’s relationship with China is not the same as China’s relationship with, say, Brazil or Chile. China’s interests in the region, and where it chooses to engage, vary widely.
That said, we can draw some general trends, primarily in terms of the message that China tries to convey across the Global South. That message is related to its own narrative and relationship with the West and the U.S. in particular. These worlds are intertwined.
When we talk about China and the Global South or Latin America, there’s this overarching narrative about cooperation, about China being a leader. We see it transmitted by ambassadors. We see it transmitted by Chinese companies from Huawei all the way to Xiaomi or China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). It’s transmitted across the board.
It’s not very explicit, but we see pronouncements from Chinese diplomats across the region that take advantage of the opportunity to drive a wedge between the United States and the region. They do it in a very intelligent way because they have been adapting to the local context and the local politics, to the extent that they know about grievances that certain political circles across the region might have with the United States. They try to exploit this to their benefit.
China’s interests in the region, and where it chooses to engage, vary widely.
To be fair, there are some exceptions. But the diplomatic engagement is usually done in a way that touches upon the talking points of political leaders across South America. They’re usually leftist political leaders or authoritarians like in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela.
Getting access to natural resources will always be one of the stepping-stones of China’s engagement with the region. Latin America is famous for being one of the providers of food across the globe and China’s food consumption is only going to grow as it gets richer.
To what extent does Beijing try to shape narratives and understanding about China in Latin America?
It all boils down to telling China’s story well. And it’s mostly about selling China as a friendly partner, one that doesn’t meddle in the internal affairs as opposed to United States, the West, Western institutions.
Then again, China’s reach is rather limited. There’s not that much interest across the region. You see greater coverage about China-related issues in Latin America, but not domestic ones. On topics like the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, or Hong Kong, or relations with Taiwan, those stories do not generate as much interest across Latin America, so they are not covered in the media. Whenever those topics do arise, China tries to counter them.
It all boils down to telling China’s story well. And it’s mostly about selling China as a friendly partner, one that doesn’t meddle in the internal affairs as opposed to United States, the West, Western institutions.
Beyond the media, how would you describe the conversation in the policy or academic community about China’s engagement in Latin America? Is anything missing from these conversations about that relationship?
There’s a lot missing. The conversation is very, very limited.
Some countries have a limited establishment in academia of China and Latin America or China’s relationship with a particular country. The exceptions are Chile, Argentina, and, to an extent, Brazil. In such a big country as Brazil, there should be a lot more people studying their relationship and its impact.
You do see some studies coming out of Mexico, but for the importance and the huge impact that China has, limited academic work is being done on the relationship. China is seeking to take advantage of that vacuum. We see this from Mexico all the way down to Patagonia.
You do so see PRC [People’s Republic of China]-connected entities sponsoring more programs, scholarships, and forums talking about China’s relationship with Latin America. That may be by a Chinese embassy, Confucius Institutes, or sometimes Chinese universities.
This puts many of the few people who study this relationship in a conundrum. You do want access to PRC officials, but that comes with a price tag. This is not widespread, but I have seen firsthand how academics shy away from certain topics because they want to take part in these events. I’m talking, for example, about the China-CELAC Forum.
There’s also an event that takes place annually in the Latin America think tank community. You will stop getting invited even if you’re not a direct critic of Beijing, but if you just touch on subjects that are considered sensitive by Beijing. From an academic’s point of view, this limits access to information.
How much understanding is there about China’s one-party system among policy makers and other political and business elites in Latin America? What are their impressions of China’s government and its own policy-making process?
The same thing applies. There is very little knowledge. China tends to be assessed as a great power. It’s not seen as a communist power or a communist state or an authoritarian state. It’s usually seen through a power lens.
That limits politicians’ understanding of the way the Chinese Communist Party works, how the Chinese government makes decisions, how China promotes itself abroad, and the way PRC diplomats engage with their counterparts across Latin America.
You do see some studies coming out of Mexico, but for the importance and the huge impact that China has, limited academic work is being done on the relationship. China is seeking to take advantage of that. If we want to talk about a potential impact in the middle-to-long term, it will come from Chinese companies, particularly in the tech sector. People actually engage with them.
Ironically, this could be seen as an old-fashioned Cold War mentality where Latin American countries are not big players in the global geopolitical scene. It’s very common to view geopolitical tensions abroad as part of the way the world works. These countries tend to think they have to choose sides, or they have to take a third approach, which is the famous non-alignment. This is usually how engagement with China is seen or perceived.
What impact does Beijing’s style of engagement, and its efforts to proactively shape narratives and understanding about itself, have on democracy and space for free expression in the region?
On the diplomatic side, Beijing’s narrative has very little impact. If we want to talk about a potential impact in the middle-to-long term, it will come from Chinese companies, particularly in the tech sector. People actually engage with them. They don’t engage with diplomats, and will very rarely read an op-ed from a Chinese ambassador, even if it’s in Spanish or Portuguese.
The changing perspective primarily will come from companies like Huawei, Xiaomi, and DiDi. Everyone engages with them. You see advertisements about companies that China considers “National Champions.” They show how the Chinese tech sector is innovating. I think this is how you will see a change in public perceptions about China and its role in the world.
In terms of a narrative, China’s diplomatic efforts are not that good, at least when you compare them with the Russians.
A new Freedom House report on Beijing’s global media influence assesses a number of countries on their vulnerability to Beijing’s efforts to disseminate propaganda, spread disinformation, censor content, or control the channels of information in different countries. Then it looks at any democratic resilience to this vulnerability. How vulnerable is Latin America to some of Beijing’s harder-edged censorship efforts? Or are any countries in the region more resilient than others?
I read the Freedom House report. Most countries across the region are quite resilient to this type of propaganda for two reasons.
First, there is a tradition of investigative journalism across the region that has traditionally focused on local issues, corruption, human rights, the environment. Even though this is not a big community, it does have a big impact. It doesn’t matter if it’s a Chinese company, the Chinese government, or any other government from across the globe. Investigative journalists at least push back when they see some type of wrongdoing, be it on the political or social side or about the environment.
China tends to be assessed as a great power. It’s not seen as a communist power or an authoritarian state. … That limits politicians’ understanding of the way the Chinese Communist Party works, how the Chinese government makes decisions, how China promotes itself abroad, and the way PRC diplomats engage with their counterparts across Latin America.
Yes, some countries are more resilient than others, but this has more to do with the local system of government and the level of institutional strengths in each country. If you are talking about Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba, local state actors promote the censorship. That includes Chinese interests. But that is only in these countries that already have a controlled media environment.
Second, there are not big Chinese communities that the PRC tries to impact. The exception could be Peru and Panama, which, because of historical reasons have a large Chinese diaspora.
But again, most of what China tries to convey are usually the talking points I mentioned at the beginning, such as non-intervention They are the typical talking points of the CCP.
